Saturday, January 15, 2005
Ante-Nicene Christology I
Modern definitions:
Excursus 1: speaking of Callistus, and thinking of the concept of bodily resurrection, remember the inscription of the deacon Severus found in the catacombs of St. Callistus (the catacombs, on the Appian Way, are at the site of the cemetery that Callistus administered, having been appointed there by Zephyrinus):
Excursus 2: speaking of Sabellius, he is mentioned in Dante's Paradiso, Canto XIII. This is where Aquinas explains to Dante in which sense Solomon is to be considered "the wisest man". Here is an excerpt of this beautiful and complex canto (with some javascript-based references to the Nicene creed, the foundation of the entire speech of Aquinas), including the stanza where Sabellius appears:
So, here Sabellius (and Arius) are accused of a most fundamental error (especially in a thomistic perspective!): of not having been able to properly apply the distinctions that make the difference between "donna Berta e ser Martino" (the English "John Doe", one could say) and the wise man; they failed because they came to conclusions too hastily, stubbornly refusing to admit their error (possibly because of pride: "l'affetto l'intelletto lega".) Too sure of their quick conclusions, off they went, and without knowing where they were actually going, "andaro e non sapëan dove", distorting the truth revelead in the Scriptures (divine revelation being the only sure guide to knowledge here.) In the end, the judgement is that they worked on a task for which they were not fit ("chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l'arte.") Certainly, as Virgil says in Purgatorio, III.34-36, "Matto è chi spera che nostra ragione / possa trascorrer la infinita via / che tiene una sustanza in tre persone.", so admittedly it was not (nor it is) an easy task.
Categories: Church_History
- Economic trinitarianism: God is three in his works, but one in his being.
- Immanent or essential
trinitarianism: the being of
God in himself has a threefold
quality.
| Ebionism |
According to Eusebius (HE,
III.27), some of the Ebionites
considered Christ
a plain and common man, who was justified only because of his superior virtue, and who was the fruit of the intercourse of a man with Mary.Others (ibid.) did accept that Christ was born of a virgin and of the Holy Spirit, but refused to acknowledge that he pre-existed, being God, Word, and Wisdom.and so were not considered essentially different from the first group. |
| Gnosticism |
As noted already, it is
difficult to confine gnosticism
within fixed categories. For what regards Christology, one could
perhaps summarize that Christ was often seen on a level with
other aeons, (inferior) emanations of the supreme God (Christ being one
of
the highest aeons); that there are multiple sons of God; and that the
dualism typical
of gnosticism makes it natural to derive that the true nature of Christ
was spiritual (docetism). According to Irenaeus (AH I.XXVI), Cerinthus thought that Christ descended upon the man Jesus (born of Joseph and Mary) in the form of a dove from the Supreme Ruler, and that then he proclaimed the unknown Father, and performed miracles. But at last Christ departed from Jesus, and that then Jesus suffered and rose again, while Christ remained impassible, inasmuch as he was a spiritual being.Cf. docetist interpretations of Mark 1:10 (the divine entering into Jesus, καταβαινον εις αυτον) and of Mark 15:34 ("God, why have you left me behind?", εγκατελιπες με) |
| Ignatius |
For Ignatius, Christ is
certainly divine:
There is one only physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true Life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord. (Rom. 7:2)And, at the same time, Christ is certainly man, and his humanity is actually the reason why Ignatius' own suffering is meaningful to him. So, against the docetists, he says But if it were as certain persons who are godless, that is unbelievers, say, that He suffered only in semblance, being themselves mere semblance, why am I in bonds? And why also do I desire to fight with wild beasts? So I die in vain. (Trall. 10:1)and Jesus was truly nailed up in the flesh for our sakes [...] and He suffered truly, as also He raised Himself truly [... and] He was in the flesh even after the resurrection. (cf. Smyrn. 1-3) |
| Justin Martyr |
From the double meaning
of Logos (reason and word, cf. Philo), Justin distinguishes two
elements in Christ's divinity:
The Logos is a person numerically distinct from the Father (hypostatical being) - numerically, but not conceptually. The Logos (before its incarnation) is responsible for the teophanies of the OT. The Logos/Christ is the Reason of reasons and is object of worship. Being Reason of reasons, in every rational soul there is something Christian: the doctrine of the Logos spermatikos. Justin suggests:
|
| Clement of Alexandria |
The Logos is the
ultimate principle of all existence, without
beginning, timeless; the revealer of the Father, the sum of all
intelligence and wisdom, the personal truth, the speaking as well as
the spoken word of creative power, the proper author of the world, the
source of light and life, the great educator of the human race, at last
becoming man, to draw us into fellowship with him and make us partakers
of his divine nature. |
| Origen
|
Eternal generation of the
Son;
but this is in close connection with eternal
creation: so the generation
is not an instantaneous act, but,
like creation, always going on. So the Father cannot be without the
Son.
But at the same time the Son exhibits
a difference in substance,
and the Son is inferior to the Father
(Deus
de Deo). The key points are
that:
Thus Origen is a proponent of essential trinitarianism: God, his Son and his Spirit are co-eternal and eternally distinct. |
| Irenaeus |
The Creator is the one and
only God, maker of heaven and
earth. Logos and "Son of God" are used interchangeably. God is above all antitheses, absolutely simple and unchangeable: in him before and after, thinking and speaking, coincide. Therefore, he repudiates the distinction of an immanent vs. expressed God (of Justin and of the Valentinians). The derivation of the Son from the Father is an incomprehensible mistery and cannot be explained. The Father is God revealing himself, the Son is God revealed (the appearing revelation). There is a clear distinction between generation and creation: the world is created, but the Son is begotten of the Father and still like him, increate, without beginning, eternal (as in the Nicene creed: genitum, non factum). But in several passages he subordinates the Son to the Father. This is probably meant to distinguish the eternal Logos from the actual Christ (the "Christ of history"), so he would not be a subordinationist. Still, he rejects the idea of the Word as one light kindled from the other (AH 2.17.4), i.e. the Nicene light from light. At the other extreme, he has been charged of sabellianism, but he asserts alike the essential unity and the eternal personal distinction of the Father and the Son. He is then not an essential trinitarian (unexplained derivation of the Son from the Father) and, at the same time, Hall says he is not an economic trinitarian either (actually to me it looks more like he could be, with his insistence on the the one and only God, against Marcion and the Gnostics). |
| Tertullian |
On the one hand he could
be labeled a subordinationist: the
Father is the whole
divine substance,
and the Son a part of it. Not two suns, but the sun and the beam, two
distinct species
in one essentia.
The sunbeam can be called
sun, but not vice versa. (remember that he was interested in opposing
the Patripassian
Praxeas.) But at the same time he proposes this threefold hypostatical existence of the Son:
Note that he explicitly says (against patripassianism) that, in the passion of Christ, the divine suffers only in the Son. Hall suggests (and rightly so, it seems to me) that Tertullian is an economic trinitarian (because of the insistence on the Father as the whole divine substance and of his concept of substantia) trying to be an essentialist (because of the eternal immanence of the Son in the Father). For what regards the person of Christ, Tertullian says there are two substances in him, Word and flesh, and they are combined, not fused: so that Christ is true God and true man. |
| Monarchianism |
God is single, so
Father, Son and Sprit are one and the same;
Jesus Christ is God, without
personal distinction from the Father. Since Father, Son and Spirit are
seen as different modes of operation of one person (God), monarchianism
is also called modalism.
And since it teaches that the Father suffers with the Son, it is also
called patripassianism.
Cf. Tertullian's
Against
Praxeas
and Hippolytus'
Against
Noetus. Note the following sequence:
|
| Hippolytus |
The Logos became man in
Christ; this Logos differs from God, and is the mediator between God
and creatures. Hippolytus (read
Lightfoot), presbyter and
probably bishop (hence "antibishop", against bishop Callistus) in Rome,
seems to bring to the west concepts typical of the east.
There is one God, the knowledge of whom we gain from the Holy Scriptures [which Scriptures?, one could obviously ask] [...]Here the key intuition was to remove the problem of ditheism introducing the clarification that equality between Father and Son (and Spirit, although, as seen above, considerations on the third person flow less smoothly) does not mean identification. |
| Novatian |
The severe Novatian
seems to develop a theology that mediates between Hippolytus and
Callistus. The Son existed in
substantia
(as an individual being) before time: "he was in
the Father before he was with
the Father", and in this he actually resembles Origen's eternal
generation of the Son. But even if the Son is distinct from the Father,
this does not imply a doctrine of two gods. |
Excursus 1: speaking of Callistus, and thinking of the concept of bodily resurrection, remember the inscription of the deacon Severus found in the catacombs of St. Callistus (the catacombs, on the Appian Way, are at the site of the cemetery that Callistus administered, having been appointed there by Zephyrinus):
Molto importante anche il riferimento alla resurrezione della carne: Severo dice che "il cubicolo accoglie il corpo della bambina Severa (morta all'età di 9 anni e 11 mesi) che resterà in questo luogo fino a quando sarà fatto risorgere da Colui (cioè dal Signore) il quale ne rapì l'anima casta, pudica e inviolabile per l'eternità: anima che sarà restituita al corpo adorna di gioia spirituale." (From romasegreta.it)The inscription is dated between 296 and 304 and is important also because it is the first document where the Bishop of Rome (Marcellinus, in this case) is called "pope" (in the inscription: "PP").
Excursus 2: speaking of Sabellius, he is mentioned in Dante's Paradiso, Canto XIII. This is where Aquinas explains to Dante in which sense Solomon is to be considered "the wisest man". Here is an excerpt of this beautiful and complex canto (with some javascript-based references to the Nicene creed, the foundation of the entire speech of Aquinas), including the stanza where Sabellius appears:
Ciò che non more e ciò che può morire(Paradiso, Canto XIII, 52-142)
non è se non splendor di quella idea
che partorisce, amando, il nostro Sire;
ché quella viva luce che sì mea
dal suo lucente, che non si disuna
da lui né da l’amor ch’a lor s’intrea,
per sua bontate il suo raggiare aduna,
quasi specchiato, in nove sussistenze,
etternalmente rimanendosi una.
Quindi discende a l’ultime potenze
giù d’atto in atto, tanto divenendo,
che più non fa che brevi contingenze;
e queste contingenze essere intendo
le cose generate, che produce
con seme e sanza seme il ciel movendo.
La cera di costoro e chi la duce
non sta d’un modo; e però sotto ’l segno
idëale poi più e men traluce.
Ond’elli avvien ch’un medesimo legno,
secondo specie, meglio e peggio frutta;
e voi nascete con diverso ingegno.
Se fosse a punto la cera dedutta
e fosse il cielo in sua virtù supprema,
la luce del suggel parrebbe tutta;
ma la natura la dà sempre scema,
similemente operando a l’artista
ch’a l’abito de l’arte ha man che trema.
Però se ’l caldo amor la chiara vista
de la prima virtù dispone e segna,
tutta la perfezion quivi s’acquista.
Così fu fatta già la terra degna
di tutta l’animal perfezïone;
così fu fatta la Vergine pregna;
sì ch’io commendo tua oppinïone,
che l’umana natura mai non fue
né fia qual fu in quelle due persone.
Or s’i’ non procedesse avanti piùe,
"Dunque, come costui fu sanza pare?"
comincerebber le parole tue.
Ma perché paia ben ciò che non pare,
pensa chi era, e la cagion che ’l mosse,
quando fu detto "Chiedi", a dimandare.
Non ho parlato sì, che tu non posse
ben veder ch’el fu re, che chiese senno
acciò che re sufficïente fosse;
non per sapere il numero in che enno
li motor di qua sù, o se necesse
con contingente mai necesse fenno;
non si est dare primum motum esse,
o se del mezzo cerchio far si puote
trïangol sì ch’un retto non avesse.
Onde, se ciò ch’io dissi e questo note,
regal prudenza è quel vedere impari
in che lo stral di mia intenzion percuote;
e se al "surse" drizzi li occhi chiari,
vedrai aver solamente respetto
ai regi, che son molti, e ’ buon son rari.
Con questa distinzion prendi ’l mio detto;
e così puote star con quel che credi
del primo padre e del nostro Diletto.
E questo ti sia sempre piombo a’ piedi,
per farti mover lento com’uom lasso
e al sì e al no che tu non vedi:
ché quelli è tra li stolti bene a basso,
che sanza distinzione afferma e nega
ne l’un così come ne l’altro passo;
perch’elli ’ncontra che più volte piega
l’oppinïon corrente in falsa parte,
e poi l’affetto l’intelletto lega.
Vie più che ’ndarno da riva si parte,
perché non torna tal qual e’ si move,
chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l’arte.
E di ciò sono al mondo aperte prove
Parmenide, Melisso e Brisso e molti,
li quali andaro e non sapëan dove;
sì fé Sabellio e Arrio e quelli stolti
che furon come spade a le Scritture
in render torti li diritti volti.
Non sien le genti, ancor, troppo sicure
a giudicar, sì come quei che stima
le biade in campo pria che sien mature;
ch’i’ ho veduto tutto ’l verno prima
lo prun mostrarsi rigido e feroce,
poscia portar la rosa in su la cima;
e legno vidi già dritto e veloce
correr lo mar per tutto suo cammino,
perire al fine a l’intrar de la foce.
Non creda donna Berta e ser Martino,
per vedere un furare, altro offerere,
vederli dentro al consiglio divino;
ché quel può surgere, e quel può cadere".
So, here Sabellius (and Arius) are accused of a most fundamental error (especially in a thomistic perspective!): of not having been able to properly apply the distinctions that make the difference between "donna Berta e ser Martino" (the English "John Doe", one could say) and the wise man; they failed because they came to conclusions too hastily, stubbornly refusing to admit their error (possibly because of pride: "l'affetto l'intelletto lega".) Too sure of their quick conclusions, off they went, and without knowing where they were actually going, "andaro e non sapëan dove", distorting the truth revelead in the Scriptures (divine revelation being the only sure guide to knowledge here.) In the end, the judgement is that they worked on a task for which they were not fit ("chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l'arte.") Certainly, as Virgil says in Purgatorio, III.34-36, "Matto è chi spera che nostra ragione / possa trascorrer la infinita via / che tiene una sustanza in tre persone.", so admittedly it was not (nor it is) an easy task.
Categories: Church_History
Comments:
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It may be of interest to note that the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in scotland let it be published (Scotsman newspaper , early February) that , a propos the tsunami disaster , "God suffers along with us"! even the liberal Baron von Hugel denounced this view after the atrocities of WW1.
Has the RC Church gone any further than tolerating theopastichism (the son suffers as God once for all on the Cross)or is the Scottish Church formally in error?
Has the RC Church gone any further than tolerating theopastichism (the son suffers as God once for all on the Cross)or is the Scottish Church formally in error?
Interesting question, but I suspect that the issues are more complex than your comment seems to suggest.
I can't certainly speak for the RC church (or for any church, for that matters), but it seems to me that at the very least one needs to clarify here what is meant by suffering of the Son, of the Father (which means defining an ontology of the persons), and what is the relationship between the two.
In the context of the early church (the topic of this post you are commenting on) this was actually the main focus. Now, any theodicy (including those proposed to "explain" the tsunami), in whatever age, should clarify these points.
It is patently clear that saying "God suffers along with us" (note: I have not read the published statements, I am only commenting on what you report) does not really clarify them. But it is also a generic enough statement to fit many options. For instance, the idea that suffering is a "locus theologicus" (you mention WW1, but Auschwitz is another classical example; and here there would be a lot to say, and a lot has actually been said by Jews, Protestants, Catholics, etc).
But even more simply: the statement can be understood in contrast with a (dualistic, platonic) idea of a God detached from the world. There is nothing "uncatholic", or "unprotestant" for that matters, in this. Theodicies have as one of their goals to confort people, and I have seen many attempts after the tsunami to reach this goal, popularizing (or even oversimplifying) theodicies or entire theological systems that are by their very nature and history rather complex.
Bottom line, and I realize this does not answer your question which, in the way it is asked, would certainly require a more detailed study (but you could perhaps start having a look at the numerous contemporary reformed and catholic texts on Christology): I don't think one should look at the Scotsman as a source for doctrinal clarifications!
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I can't certainly speak for the RC church (or for any church, for that matters), but it seems to me that at the very least one needs to clarify here what is meant by suffering of the Son, of the Father (which means defining an ontology of the persons), and what is the relationship between the two.
In the context of the early church (the topic of this post you are commenting on) this was actually the main focus. Now, any theodicy (including those proposed to "explain" the tsunami), in whatever age, should clarify these points.
It is patently clear that saying "God suffers along with us" (note: I have not read the published statements, I am only commenting on what you report) does not really clarify them. But it is also a generic enough statement to fit many options. For instance, the idea that suffering is a "locus theologicus" (you mention WW1, but Auschwitz is another classical example; and here there would be a lot to say, and a lot has actually been said by Jews, Protestants, Catholics, etc).
But even more simply: the statement can be understood in contrast with a (dualistic, platonic) idea of a God detached from the world. There is nothing "uncatholic", or "unprotestant" for that matters, in this. Theodicies have as one of their goals to confort people, and I have seen many attempts after the tsunami to reach this goal, popularizing (or even oversimplifying) theodicies or entire theological systems that are by their very nature and history rather complex.
Bottom line, and I realize this does not answer your question which, in the way it is asked, would certainly require a more detailed study (but you could perhaps start having a look at the numerous contemporary reformed and catholic texts on Christology): I don't think one should look at the Scotsman as a source for doctrinal clarifications!
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