Monday, February 28, 2005
Origen's thought
Cf.this article on
Origen in the Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
It is absolutely difficult to summarize Origen's fascinating thoughts, even in the form of study notes. Let's start from Origen's idea of the Trinity.
The Father is a purely spiritual mind, perfect unity, perfectly simple, without body. Note the following statement (which reminds me much of Aquinas, more on this later):
Father and Son are clearly recognizable from the Scriptures:
See the influence of this hierarchy of salvation in Proclus, in the Liber de Causis, and in Aquinas (the latter, in the interesting article Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI, is defined not as "the true Aristotelian" anymore, but as a "Platonized Aristotelian", or as a "Aristotelized Platonist").
Now, this procession of the Spirit does not imply for Origen that the Spirit derives his knowledge through revelation from the Son (because this would imply passing from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge). So, we are to say, and this directly derives from the concept of unity in the Trinity, that the Holy Spirit has always been the Holy Spirit. Note how modern this statement is:
So, salvation must imply the action of the entire Trinity: first, one derives his existence from the Father; then, rational nature from the Son; and finally, holiness from the Holy Spirit.
Origen described the unity of Father, Son and Spirit using the term homoousious (same essence, or ousia); but he also says that Father, Son and Spirit differ in hypostasis (individual subsistence): in other words, they are different persons (and, as noted already, not in a merely economic sense). So these persons are eternally and really distinct; and monotheism is preserved by Origen through the ingenious explanation that Son and Spirit possess derivately all the characteristics of the deity.
The unity of the Trinity is manifested for example in the divine will: as G.L. Prestige puts it, Origen "repeats that the Father and the Son are two 'things' (pragmata) in objectivity, but one in consent and harmony and identity of purpose". Quoting directly Origen:
Contrast the soul of Christ with "the other souls", all of which have a various degree of understanding and ultimately of communion with God:
Origen is careful though to state that these are "opinions", and not necessarily theological truths:
From the above, it is clear that soteriology is what really interests Origen. As a matter of fact, one should interpret all of Origen's views on martyrdom, human life, prayer, Scripture, and so on, in the light of his soteriology.
This soteriology is inextricably linked to his concept of free will. This is a point where the contrast between Origen's system and gnosticism is most apparent. His philosophical arguments for free will are found in book III of De Principiis. First of all, the man's rational nature is the foundation of free will:
The following passage shows the relationship between free will, devil's temptations, and divine providence:
The role of Christ in Origen's soteriology is well explained by this quotation of B. Drewery:
I shall now briefly say something about Origen's interpretation of Scripture. Read K. Wear's interesting article Exegetical Theory and Practice in Origen and Bereshit Rabba. Origen explains his ideas on biblical exegesis in the fourth book of De Principiis. First of all, Scripture is to be read and interpreted within the tradition of the Church (another example of why Origen is aptly named "a man of the church"; actually this is what allows him to stop short of the excesses of the exegesis typical of the Gnostics):
The distinction between the soulful and the literal and spiritual meanings is not very clear. Some have proposed to replace "soul" by "moral", so we would have the literal, the moral, and the spiritual sense of Scripture. In practice anyway, Origen attaches the greatest importance to the spiritual meaning; obviously this meaning is to be looked for in passages showing apparent inconsistencies or difficulties; but in general the entire Scripture should be undestood in a spiritual sense (and the fundamental reason for this is obviously that Scripture is the work of the Spirit). So that:
Augustine, with many others, will continue Origen's method of allegorical interpretation (actually adding the fourth level of anagogical interpretation); and this exegetical tradition will continue more or less undisputed (well, Jerome for example had something to say about Origen's methods) for many centuries, till perhaps Luther's definition of the allegorizers as "clerical jugglers performing monkey tricks" (Luther also said that "Origen's allegories are not worth so much dirt") and the first signs of the historical-critical method of exegesis.
Categories: Church_History
It is absolutely difficult to summarize Origen's fascinating thoughts, even in the form of study notes. Let's start from Origen's idea of the Trinity.
The Father is a purely spiritual mind, perfect unity, perfectly simple, without body. Note the following statement (which reminds me much of Aquinas, more on this later):
Having refuted, then, as well as we could, every notion which might suggest that we were to think of God as in any degree corporeal, we go on to say that, according to strict truth, God is incomprehensible, and incapable of being measured. For whatever be the knowledge which we are able to obtain of God, either by perception or reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is by many degrees far better than what we perceive Him to be. (De Principiis, I.I.V)And on divine simplicity:
But God, who is the beginning of all things, is not to be regarded as a composite being, lest perchance there should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of which everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite.But God is also "personal and active": so Origen posits the existence of another entity, who has always been with the Father, and upon which the Father exercises his intellectual activity. This is the Son. He is the first emanation of the Father, and can also be called the Logos, or Wisdom. The Son was always with the Father because
[Who] can suppose or believe that God the Father ever existed, even for a moment of time, without having generated this Wisdom? For in that case he must say either that God was unable to generate Wisdom before He produced her, so that He afterwards called into being her who formerly did not exist, or that He possessed the power indeed, but--what cannot be said of God without impiety--was unwilling to use it; both of which suppositions, it is patent to all, are alike absurd and impious: for they amount to this, either that God advanced from a condition of inability to one of ability, or that, although possessed of the power, He concealed it, and delayed the generation of Wisdom. (De Principiis, I.II.II)A key point to note is the continuous generation of the Son. This continuous generation derives logically from the idea that a one-off separation implies change and therefore cannot be predicated of God.
Father and Son are clearly recognizable from the Scriptures:
For although no one is able to speak with certainty of God the Father, it is nevertheless possible for some knowledge of Him to be gained by means of the visible creation and the natural feelings of the human mind; and it is possible, moreover, for such knowledge to be confined from the sacred Scriptures. But with respect to the Son of God, although no one knoweth the Son save the Father, yet it is from sacred Scripture also that the human mind is taught how to think of the Son; and that not only from the New, but also from the Old Testament, by means of those things which, although done by the saints, are figuratively referred to Christ, and from which both His divine nature, and that human nature which was assumed by Him, may be discovered. (De Principiis, I.III.I)Then there is the Spirit, also recognizable from the Scriptures, and who proceeds from the Son (graphically, Father -> Son -> Spirit). The Spirit directly reveals God:
We must understand, therefore, that as the Son, who alone knows the Father, reveals Him to whom He will, so the Holy Spirit, who alone searches the deep things of God, reveals God to whom He will. (De Principiis, I.III.IV)This "to whom He will" can be more precisely characterized by saying that the power of the Father is universal; that the power of the Son corresponds to rational creatures only; and that the power of the Spirit corresponds to "the Saints". In particular, Origen says that the operation of the Holy Spirit takes place only in those "who are already turning to a better life, and walking along the way which leads to Jesus Christ, i.e., who are engaged in the performance of good actions, and who abide in God." (De Principiis, I.III.V)
See the influence of this hierarchy of salvation in Proclus, in the Liber de Causis, and in Aquinas (the latter, in the interesting article Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI, is defined not as "the true Aristotelian" anymore, but as a "Platonized Aristotelian", or as a "Aristotelized Platonist").
Now, this procession of the Spirit does not imply for Origen that the Spirit derives his knowledge through revelation from the Son (because this would imply passing from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge). So, we are to say, and this directly derives from the concept of unity in the Trinity, that the Holy Spirit has always been the Holy Spirit. Note how modern this statement is:
For if this were the case [of progressive knowledge of the Spirit], the Holy Spirit would never be reckoned in the Unity of the Trinity, i.e., along with the unchangeable Father and His Son, unless He had always been the Holy Spirit. When we use, indeed, such terms as "always" or "was," or any other designation of time, they are not to be taken absolutely, but with due allowance; for while the significations of these words relate to time, and those subjects of which we speak are spoken of by a stretch of language as existing in time, they nevertheless surpass in their real nature all conception of the finite understanding. (De Principiis, I.III.IV)Also note that this fits quite well with the thomistic idea of omniscience and omnipresence of God, presenting God as independent from the laws (as we perceive them at least) of space and time.
So, salvation must imply the action of the entire Trinity: first, one derives his existence from the Father; then, rational nature from the Son; and finally, holiness from the Holy Spirit.
Origen described the unity of Father, Son and Spirit using the term homoousious (same essence, or ousia); but he also says that Father, Son and Spirit differ in hypostasis (individual subsistence): in other words, they are different persons (and, as noted already, not in a merely economic sense). So these persons are eternally and really distinct; and monotheism is preserved by Origen through the ingenious explanation that Son and Spirit possess derivately all the characteristics of the deity.
The unity of the Trinity is manifested for example in the divine will: as G.L. Prestige puts it, Origen "repeats that the Father and the Son are two 'things' (pragmata) in objectivity, but one in consent and harmony and identity of purpose". Quoting directly Origen:
This [that nothing in the Trinity can be called greater or lesser] is most clearly pointed out by the Apostle Paul, when demonstrating that the power of the Trinity is one and the same, in the words, "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; there are diversities of administrations, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God who worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit: withal." From which it most clearly follows that there is no difference in the Trinity, but that which is called the gift of the Spirit is made known through the Son, and operated by God the Father. (De Principiis, I.III.VII)But who is really Christ? Here we need to briefly mention Origen's theory about "the fall". The creation was a collectivity of rational beings (a fixed number, not infinite; eternal, but not in time; all of them equal because there was no reason for diversity, but each one endowed with free will), and God's intention was that these rational beings would contemplate him forever. But most of them lapsed, and falled away into an existence on their own terms. The one creature that did not fall and remained with God was the soul of Christ:
That the nature, indeed, of His soul was the same as that of all others cannot be doubted otherwise it could not be called a soul were it not truly one. But since the power of choosing good and evil is within the reach of all, this soul which belonged to Christ elected to love righteousness, so that in proportion to the immensity of its love it clung to it unchangeably and inseparably, so that firmness of purpose, and immensity of affection, and an inextinguishable warmth of love, destroyed all susceptibility (sensum) for alteration and change; and that which formerly depended upon the will was changed by the power of long custom into nature; and so we must believe that there existed in Christ a human and rational soul, without supposing that it had any feeling or possibility of sin. (De Principiis, II.VI.V)(actually the last sentence seems to contradict, the way it is expressed, the very concept of free will in the soul of Christ)
Contrast the soul of Christ with "the other souls", all of which have a various degree of understanding and ultimately of communion with God:
It seems to me that this very decay and falling away of the understanding is not the same in all, but that this conversion into a soul is carried to a greater or less degree in different instances, and that certain understandings retain something even of their former vigour, and others again either nothing or a very small amount. Whence some are found from the very commencement of their lives to be of more active intellect, others again of a slower habit of mind, and some are born wholly obtuse, and altogether incapable of instruction. (De Principiis, II.VIII.IV)In the first book of De Principiis Origen explains with a similitude the process through which the "fallen souls" detached from God: it is as if a very skilled professional, who knows everything there is to know in his field, starts not to apply himself anymore to his job: he will progressively loose all his knowledge. In an analogous way, the creatures who progressively distanced themselves from "the divine warmth" (De Principiis, II.VIII.III) assume different forms, more and more material the farther away they move from God.
Origen is careful though to state that these are "opinions", and not necessarily theological truths:
Our statement, however, that the understanding is converted into a soul, or whatever else seems to have such a meaning, the reader must carefully consider and settle for himself, as these views are not be regarded as advanced by us in a dogmatic manner, but simply as opinions, treated in the style of investigation and discussion. (De Principiis, II.VIII.IV)This is not the only case where Origen suggests that more investigation and discussion is needed; all the following quotations come from De Principiis:
- In regard to the Holy
Spirit, it is not yet clearly known whether he is to be thought of as
begotten or unbegotten, or as being himself
also a Son of God or not. [from the quotation above, Origen thinks that
the Spirit is unbegotted, if not
else for the sake of the unity of the Trinity]
- In regard to the soul,
whether it takes its rise from the transference of the seed, in such a
way that the principle of substance of the sould may be regarded as
inherent in the seminal particles of the body itself; or whether it has
some other beginning, and whether this beginning is begotten or
unbegotten, or at any rate whether it is imparted to the body from
without or no; all this is not very clearly defined in the teaching.
- In regard to the devil and
his angels and the opposing spiritual powers. the Church's teaching
lays it down that these beings exist, but what they are or how they
exist it has not explained very clearly. [he will propose his theory of
the fall]
- What existed before this world, or what will exist after it, has not yet been made known openly to many, for no clear statement on the point is set forth in the Church's teaching.
- [There are] certain angels
and good powers, who minister to the salvation of men; but when they
were created, and what are their characteristics, no one has in any way
made plain. [Origen's angelology is quite developed; since angels are
souls that sinned "little", they are intimate friends of the divinity
and instruct the Church, i.e. the people of God, throughout the OT; and
even
after Christ "some certain spiritual powers have come into a presiding
office over particular nations in this world." Angels are present at
baptism and at Christian assemblies; they are tasked with
evangelization;
and
All of the faithful in Christ, no matter how small, are helped by an angel, and Christ says that these angels always see the face of the Father who is in heaven.
This doctrine of the guardian angel can actually be found already in Hermas and in Clement of Alexandria.]
- As for the sun, moon and
stars, the tradition does not clearly say whether they are living
beings or without life. [here we should remember Clement of Alexandria
who, in the Protrepticus, attacks Alcmaeon of Croton for believing that
the stars are gods and alive, and Xenocrates for suggesting that the
planets and the cosmos are eight gods. Clement, Philo and Justin all
propose that God allowed the pagans to worship the heavenly bodies so
that they may be spared from atheism and might have at least some
knowledge of the divine. Now, while Origen denies worshipping the
stars, still he believes that they are living beings. See this
quotation:
The sun also, and the moon and the rest of the heavenly bodies are living beings; and moreover, just as we men for certain sins have been enveloped in these bodies of ours, which are gross and heavy, so the lights of heaven have been given bodies of one sort or another to enable them to provide more or less light, while the demons, for greater offenses, have been clothed with real bodies.
It would be most interesting to explore more in depth Origen's views on physics and astronomy.]
- no true piety can be found
in a man who despises philosophy; but, at the same time, philosophy can
look "like gold which the Hebrews took from Egypt, instead of using it
in establishing the Tabernacle they made the golden bull." So,
philosophy must be used in the service of Christ, and must be
considered as a preparatory discipline.
- he adopts (to some extent,
see later)
platonism in order to refute gnosticism, stoicism and epicureanism.
There are numerous quotations from Plato's works in Contra Celsus; some
of them are admired, others are refuted by Origen. And despite his
platonism, Origen openly criticizes Plato from a Christian point of
view for not having broken with politheism (but Plato's metaphysical
system is accepted). So, human behavior is definitely important; for
this
reason also, Epicureanism is "philosophy's shame" with its morality of
pleasure, opposed to the way of the Cross (and with its negation of
Providence). Againsts stoicism, Origen believes that the divine ousia
is
immaterial; he also proposed human freedom.
- the power of the speculative mind to solve all questions through reasoning, except one: the concept of God is above reason.
- the world of ideas as
opposed to the world of matter. Of utmost importance is the return of
the soul, by means of knowledge, to unity with its divine
source. A. Tripolitis (quoted at the copticchurch website) clearly
expresses some of the differences between Origen and Plotinus (both
were disciples of Ammonius Saccas):
According to Plotinus, the human rational soul, which is a person's true nature, is a direct emanation of the divine essence. It is a part of the divine world, a being which exists on the lowest level of divinity and therefore in continuous and direct relationship with the divine intellect. Origen, as a Christian who was influenced by the biblical view of creation, could not accept so exalted a view of human nature, that the rational should be a part of the divine and in direct association with it. This biblical pessimism notwithstanding, he did find, through a rational interpretation of the Genesis narratives, the basis for a qualified assertion of the soul’s participation in the divine. Adhering to the Platonic doctrine of "assimilation to God," both Plotinus and Origen maintain that the world of sense is alien to the soul and a hindrance to the soul’s realization of its own true nature. Each believes that a person’s goal should be to become liberated from the things of sense and to realize one’s divine nature as logos or logikos, thus regaining one’s original status. The rational soul possesses within itself both the desire and power for communion with the divine. The attainment of perfection and the regaining of original purity is thus within the grasp of human capability.
So, the difference between the two is fundamentally an anthropological one: for Plotinus, the human is essentially divine (philosophy and gnosis being the way through which one can achieve this insight); Origen, as a Christian, is more biblically oriented and is "less optimistic than Plotinus about the inherent goodness of human nature, but more optimistic about the possibility of eternal salvation for all created beings." J. Pelikan says, "One of the most decisive differences between a theologian and a philosopher is that the former understands himself as, in Origen's classic phrase, a man of the church, a spokesman for the Christian community."
Both Origen and Plotinus claim that the ability and power, movement and desire, to return to God have from the beginning been implanted by God within the soul. Both Origen and Plotinus state that it is the responsibility of the individual soul to recognize the power within it and, by means of this power, to strive conscientiously to attain the world of intelligible realities.
But it is only Origen, who holds to the soul’s unstable and changeable nature, in whose writings we find the insistence on the soul’s inability, of itself, to realize and utilize the divine power implanted within it to attain ultimate communion with God. It is important for the soul to realize and acknowledge its own limitations, that is, its instability and dependence, if it is to turn to God for that grace without which salvation is impossible.
From the above, it is clear that soteriology is what really interests Origen. As a matter of fact, one should interpret all of Origen's views on martyrdom, human life, prayer, Scripture, and so on, in the light of his soteriology.
This soteriology is inextricably linked to his concept of free will. This is a point where the contrast between Origen's system and gnosticism is most apparent. His philosophical arguments for free will are found in book III of De Principiis. First of all, the man's rational nature is the foundation of free will:
The rational animal, however, has, in addition to its phantasial nature, also reason, which judges the phantasies, and disapproves of some and accepts others, in order that the animal may be led according to them. Therefore, since there are in the nature of reason aids towards the contemplation of virtue and vice, by following which, after beholding good and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. [...]It is true that the devil contends with men, "inciting and instigating men to sin". But note that there are sins that do not necessarily derive just from our having a body, i.e. from us being human.
Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, arouses us towards efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse. [...]
To say that we are moved from without, and to put away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy the conception of free-will. [...]
Reason, therefore, demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as a judge and an investigator of the manner in which we ought to meet those events that come from without. (De Principiis, III.I.IIIff)
The following passage shows the relationship between free will, devil's temptations, and divine providence:
There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. (loc. cit.)This concept of divine providence is intrinsecally linked to the individuality of each and every one of us:
For as the presidents of the public games do not allow the competitors to enter the lists indiscriminately or fortuitously, but after a careful examination, pairing in a most impartial consid eration either of size or age, this individual with that--boys, e.g., with boys, men with men, who are nearly related to each other either in age or strength; so also must we understand the procedure of divine providence, which arranges on most impartial principles all who descend into the struggles of this human life, according to the nature of each individual's power, which is known only to Him who alone beholds the hearts of men: so that one individual fights against one temptation of the flesh, another against a second; one is exposed to its influence for so long a period of time, another only for so long; one is tempted by the flesh to this or that indulgence, another to one of a different kind; one has to resist this or that hostile power, another has to combat two or three at the same time; or at one time this hostile influence, at another that; at some particular date having to resist one enemy, and at another a different one; being, after the performance of certain acts, exposed to one set of enemies, after others to a second. (loc. cit.)And it is because of this "just" bestowal of divine providence that we have free will:
Now, although we have said that it is by the just judgment of God that every one is tempted according to the amount of his strength, we are not therefore to suppose that he who is tempted ought by all means to prove victorious in the struggle; in like manner as he who contends in the lists, although paired with his adversary on a just principle of arrangement, will nevertheless not necessarily prove conqueror. But unless the powers of the combatants are equal, the prize of the victor will not be justly won; nor will blame justly attach to the vanquished, because He allows us indeed to be tempted, but not "beyond what we are able:" for it is in proportion to our strength that we are tempted; and it is not written that, in temptation, He will make also a way to escape so as that we should bear it, but a way to escape so as that we should be able to bear it. But it depends upon ourselves to use either with energy or feebleness this power which He has given us. (loc. cit.)So, in essence, all souls have in themselves free will, and all were good; but this goodness is accidental and not essential, because (once more how tomistic this seems) "God alone is good by His own nature."
The role of Christ in Origen's soteriology is well explained by this quotation of B. Drewery:
Christ became like men that they might become like Him: He made available all good things-teaching the way to God, warning of judgment, exemplifying the good life, converting, reforming, purging from evil, gladdening His followers, sowing the seed of God’s word, opening the kingdom of God to all the world, to unworthy as well as worthy, even if not to the unwilling.This can be expressed more precisely and more strongly with the idea that salvation is realized through Atonement. And the resurrection of Christ is the source of our own resurrection.
I shall now briefly say something about Origen's interpretation of Scripture. Read K. Wear's interesting article Exegetical Theory and Practice in Origen and Bereshit Rabba. Origen explains his ideas on biblical exegesis in the fourth book of De Principiis. First of all, Scripture is to be read and interpreted within the tradition of the Church (another example of why Origen is aptly named "a man of the church"; actually this is what allows him to stop short of the excesses of the exegesis typical of the Gnostics):
Concerning the four Gospels which alone are uncontroverted in the Church of God under heaven, I have learned by tradition that the Gospel according to Matthew, who was at one time a publican and afterwards an Apostle of Jesus Christ, was written first; and that he composed it in the Hebrew tongue and published it for the converts from Judaism (Commentary on Matthew 1).Then, Scripture is divinely inspired. If this is so, then contradictions in the Scripture cannot be but apparent:
But as (the doctrine of) providence is not at all weakened (on account of those things which are not understood) in the eyes of those who have once honestly accepted it, so neither is the divinity of Scripture, which extends to the whole of it, (lost) on account of the inability of our weakness to discover in every expression the hidden splendour of the doctrines veiled in common and unattractive phraseology. For we have the treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power of God may shine forth, and that it may not be deemed to proceed from us (who are but) human beings. (De Principiis, IV.I.VIIff - whenever possible, I try to quote from the Greek rather than from the Latin of Rufinus' translation)The latin text explicitly also says, "Many, not understanding the Scriptures in a spiritual sense, but incorrectly, have fallen into heresies"; therefore, inconsistencies in the text are either due to our deficiencies, or to our failure to see or understand an allegorical sense in them. Now, Origen uses Scripture (Prov. 22:20-21, reading τρισσως, threefold meaning, and not, as in most translations, "thirty sayings") to explain how Scripture should be read: according to the letter, to the soul, and to the spirit:
The way, then, as it appears to us, in which we ought to deal with the Scriptures, and extract from them their meaning, is the following, which has been ascertained from the Scriptures themselves. [...]Incidentally, this is an example of one of Origen's consistent principles: explaining the Bible by the Bible.
The individual ought, then, to portray the ideas of holy Scripture in a threefold manner upon his own soul; in order that the simple man may be edified by the "flesh," as it were, of the Scripture, for so we name the obvious sense; while he who has ascended a certain way (may be edified) by the "soul," as it were. The perfect man, again, and he who resembles those spoken of by the apostle, when he says, "We speak wisdom among them that are perfect, but not the wisdom of the world, nor of the rulers of this world, who come to nought; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, the hidden wisdom, which God hath ordained before the ages, unto our glory," (may receive edification) from the spiritual law, which has a shadow of good things to come. For as man consists of body, and soul, and spirit, so in the same way does Scripture, which has been arranged to be given by God for the salvation of men. (loc. cit.)
The distinction between the soulful and the literal and spiritual meanings is not very clear. Some have proposed to replace "soul" by "moral", so we would have the literal, the moral, and the spiritual sense of Scripture. In practice anyway, Origen attaches the greatest importance to the spiritual meaning; obviously this meaning is to be looked for in passages showing apparent inconsistencies or difficulties; but in general the entire Scripture should be undestood in a spiritual sense (and the fundamental reason for this is obviously that Scripture is the work of the Spirit). So that:
As there are certain passages of Scripture which do not at all contain the "corporeal" sense, as we shall show in the following (paragraphs), there are also places where we must seek only for the "soul," as it were, and "spirit" of Scripture. [...]But, as K. Wear says, Origen is quite liberal in applying his own guidelines:
The word of God has arranged that certain stumbling-blocks, as it were, and offences, and impossibilities, should be introduced into the midst of the law and the history, in order that we may not, through being drawn away in all directions by the merely attractive nature of the language, either altogether fall away from the (true) doctrines, as learning nothing worthy of God, or, by not departing from the letter, come to the knowledge of nothing more divine. (loc. cit.)
Origen freely extends his theory in practice, regularly allowing himself to assert readings which have no such biblical foundation (cf. Homilies on Genesis 1.2). Finally, having determined an acceptable spiritual meaning for the passage in question and reapplying it to its original position within Scripture, one may set about allegorizing even those previously unproblematic passages to suit this newly attendant spiritual context.Now, allegorism in the OT is generally meant to explain the first coming of Christ; and allegorism in the NT is meant to explain the second coming of Christ: as J. Danielou said, "a new idea comes out here: the New Testament in turn is seen as a figure of the Kingdom that is to come."
Augustine, with many others, will continue Origen's method of allegorical interpretation (actually adding the fourth level of anagogical interpretation); and this exegetical tradition will continue more or less undisputed (well, Jerome for example had something to say about Origen's methods) for many centuries, till perhaps Luther's definition of the allegorizers as "clerical jugglers performing monkey tricks" (Luther also said that "Origen's allegories are not worth so much dirt") and the first signs of the historical-critical method of exegesis.
Categories: Church_History
