Davide's Notes

Why was forgiveness of post-baptismal sins in the pre-nicene Church a controversial topic?

For Hermas, "the repentance of the righteous has limits". The text could be clearer, but it seems to say that, if one "repents with all his heart, and drives all doubts from his mind", then forgiveness will be given for "all the sins which in former times one committed" (whether this includes the concept of original sin I can't really say; implicitly, perhaps.) The occasion for forgiveness seems to be then one of complete adherence to the salvific message of Christ; but the important addendum here is that

the Lord has sworn by His glory, in regard to His elect, that if any one of them sin after a certain day which has been fixed, he shall not be saved. For the repentance of the righteous has limits. Filled up are the days of repentance to all the saints; but to the heathen, repentance will be possible even to the last day. (Vis. II.2.1-6)

So, once you are part of the community of the saints, you may not partake of salvation if you happen to sin; but if you are still to embrace the message of Christ, you can still repent and thus be saved. This starts a pattern that we are going to find in several other authors later (and which will result in the tendency to delay baptism as much as possible). The concept is made even more explicit by Hermas when he says

"I heard, sir, some teachers maintain that there is no other repentance than that which takes place, when we descended into the water and received remission of our former sins." He said to me, "That was sound doctrine which you heard; for that is really the case. For he who has received remission of his sins ought not to sin any more, but to live in purity." (Mand. IV.3.1-2)

So at this point it seems that baptism is understood to be a most rigid Great Divide. But Hermas then adds:

"And therefore I say to you, that if any one is tempted by the devil, and sins after that great and holy calling. in which the Lord has called His people to everlasting life, he has opportunity to repent but once. But if he should sin frequently after this, and then repent, to such a man his repentance will be of no avail; for with difficulty will he live." (Mand. IV.3.6)

Therefore, the "limit" Hermas was referring to above is now set to at most one repentance after baptism.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Heb 6:4-8 seems to suggest, with Vis II.2.1-6 and Mand. IV.3.1-2, the impossibility of repentance for those who had been baptized and then committed sin:

It is impossible for those who have once been enlightened, who have tasted the heavenly gift, who have shared in the Holy Spirit, who have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the coming age, if they fall away, to be brought back to repentance, because to their loss they are crucifying the Son of God all over again and subjecting him to public disgrace.
Land that drinks in the rain often falling on it and that produces a crop useful to those for whom it is farmed receives the blessing of God. But land that produces thorns and thistles is worthless and is in danger of being cursed. In the end it will be burned.

Clement treats sin with explicit references to the OT, and apparently sees no problems with multiple repentance and forgiveness. It is remarkable that he quotes Jonah and the Ninivites, who were saved although they were not part of the people of Israel:

Noah preached repentance, and as many as listened to him were saved. Jonah proclaimed destruction to the Ninevites; but they, repenting of their sins, propitiated God by prayer, and obtained salvation, although they were aliens [to the covenant] of God.
[...]
The ministers of the grace of God have, by the Holy Spirit, spoken of repentance; and the Lord of all things has himself declared with an oath regarding it, "As I live, says the Lord, I desire not the death of the sinner, but rather his repentance;" adding, moreover, this gracious declaration: "Repent O house of Israel, of your iniquity. Say to the children of My people, Though your sins reach from earth to heaven, and though they be redder than scarlet, and blacker than sackcloth, if you turn to Me with your whole heart, and say, Father! I will listen to you, as to a holy people." (1 Clement, VII.VIII)

The Didache explicitly says that transgressions should be confessed so that the sacrifice of the eucharist be pure - therefore, this confession (and the associated purification deriving from it) can be repeated several times:

But every Lord's day gather yourselves together, and break bread, and give thanksgiving after having confessed your transgressions, that your sacrifice may be pure. But let no one who is at odds with his fellow come together with you, until they be reconciled, that your sacrifice may not be profaned. (Didache, XIV)

Ignatius dealt with sin in several places. He suggests the idea, which obviously will have to be refined very soon, that the man possessing true faith does not sin, nor hate (cf. Eph. XIV); Ignatius' concern for unity ("If any man follows him that makes a schism in the Church, he shall not inherit the kingdom of God.", Phil. III) leads him to desire no divisions, but rather agreement with the bishop:

To all them that repent, the Lord grants forgiveness, if they turn in penitence to the unity of God, and to communion with the bishop. (Philadelphians, VIII)

This process of contrition and forgiveness is not as detailed as in Hermas, and it does not seem to cover sins different from schism, which is what interests Ignatius here.

An interesting departure from these subjective patterns of repentence/forgiveness can be found in Polycarp, when he grieves on account of Valens, "who was once a presbyter among you":

I am deeply grieved, therefore, brethren, for him (Valens) and his wife; to whom may the Lord grant true repentance! (Philippians, XI)

It is interesting that here the main actor is explicitly the Lord, the giver of the grace that brings repentance, rather than the man Valens. For what regards multiple repentance, this does not seem a problem for Polycarp, who makes explicit reference to Luke 6:37 in Philippians II ("Judge not, that ye be not judged; forgive, and it shall be forgiven unto you; be merciful, that ye may obtain mercy; with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again").

So, apart from Hermas, we see that in the very early Church multiple repentance was not considered to be a big issue, and direct references to both the OT and the NT seemed to suggest that this was an entirely legitimate interpretation. But things were to change once conflicts between competing churches or ideologies started to emerge.

Hippolytus is extremely clear in saying that repentance and forgiveness have to be "validated" and cannot be exercised privately. For Hippolytus the bad example is Callistus, who allegedly remitted sins to everybody, as long as they joined his own church. We see here very clearly that the concept of "sin" and the practice of "remitting sins" can be very powerful devices. While Hippolytus is clearly outraged by this behavior of Callistus', it has to be said that the alternative would possibly have been to leave outsiders join other cults or sects, so Callistus' choice was definitely a strategic one. What is at stake here is the authority to declare what is orthodox and what is not (we'll see this also very clearly in the disputes on the validity of the rite of baptism performed by the different churches).

But the other allegation that Hippolytus brings against Callistus is also extremely important: Callistus apparently said that

if a bishop was guilty of any sin, if even a sin unto death, he ought not to be deposed. About the time of this man, bishops, priests, and deacons, who had been twice married, and thrice married, began to be allowed to retain their place among the clergy. If also, however, any one who is in holy orders should become married, Callistus permitted such a one to continue in holy orders as if he had not sinned. (Ref. VII)

This touches on the problem of the dignity of the bishopric office. Is it affected by personal sins? We'll see Cyprianus' answer later.

Tertullian, as it happens for several of his ideas, holds different opinions on repentance of post-baptismal sin before and after his conversion to Montanism. Before becoming a Montanist, he allows (although not enthusiastically) for a second repentance; this is the well-known passsage where he introduces the concept of ἐξομολόγησις:

So long, Lord Christ, may the blessing of learning or hearing concerning the discipline of repentance be granted to Thy servants, as is likewise behoves them, while learners, not to sin; in other words, may they thereafter know nothing of repentance, and require nothing of it. It is irksome to append mention of a second----nay, in that case, the last----hope;
[...]
These poisons of [the devil], therefore, God foreseeing, although the gate of forgiveness has been shut and fastened up with the bar of baptism, has permitted it still to stand somewhat open. In the vestibule He has stationed the second repentance for opening to such as knock: but now once for all, because now for the second time; but never more because the last time it had been in vain.
[...]
The narrower, then, the sphere of action of this second and only (remaining) repentance, the more laborious is its probation; in order that it may not be exhibited in the conscience alone, but may likewise be carried out in some (external) act. This act, which is more usually expressed and commonly spoken of under a Greek name, is ἐξομολόγησις, whereby we confess our sins to the Lord, not indeed as if He were ignorant of them, but inasmuch as by confession satisfaction is settled, of confession repentance is born; by repentance God is appeased. And thus exomologesis is a discipline for man's prostration and humiliation, enjoining a demeanor calculated to move mercy. (De Poenitentia, VII.IX)

After Tertullian embraced Montanism, he thought that a second repentance was not possible anymore, consistently with his rigid moral requirements and his concern for the purity of the church. As a matter of fact, sins are divided by Tertullian into two groups:

the faults, which are committed against a brother, are cleansed but not those against God. And accordingly we promise in the paternoster to forgive our debtors. But it is not proper in addition to distort the authority of such pronouncements alternately now here, now there - like pulling on a rope - to their very opposite, so that one page seems to pull the bridle of the doctrine and the next to relax it, while, if they are uncertain, the one seems to destroy even the value of penitence by weakness, the other to deny it completely by austerity. [...] According to this difference of the sins, you must make a difference between the possibilities of mercy. Sometimes you may gain forgiveness, that is to be understood, when your sin may be forgiven; sometimes you cannot under any circumstances gain forgiveness, i. e. of course - when your sin is not to be forgiven. (De Pudicitia, II)

In this last phase of his life, Tertullian labels even the rigid enough Hermas an "apocryphal shepherd of the adulterers":

I should admit you were right, if the tract, called "Pastor", which only stands up for the adulterers, had deserved to be taken up in the Holy Writ, if it were not considered by every congregation, even your own, to be apocryphal and forged, adulterous even itself and for that reason a spokeman for its compeers (De Pudicitia, X)

So, it is understandable why for Tertullian baptism is so important: because it is really the only occasion one has to see his sins forgiven. For this reason he writes:

With no less reason ought the unmarried also to be delayed until they either marry or are firmly established in continence: until then, temptation lies in wait for them, for virgins because they are ripe for it, and for widows because of their wandering about. All who understand what a burden baptism is will have more fear of obtaining it than of its postponement. (De Baptismo, XVIII)

This also explains why he was against infant baptism (about which see also the notes on Baptism in the Early Church).

Origen is less strict than Tertullian on reconciliation: it is always possible to be restored in purity, but with a distinction: mortal guilt can be pardoned an indefinite number of times, while a "mortal crime", like blaspheming the faith, can only be pardoned once. This is apparently to allow lapsed to re-enter the church, while at the same time requiring that this abandoning/returning to the church not be turned into a pattern:

There is always an opening for recovery when, for example, some mortal guilt ["culpa mortalis"] has found us out that does not consist in mortal crime ["crimen mortale"] like blaspheming the faith, but in some vice of speech or habit.... Such guilt can always be repaired, and penance is never denied for sins of this kind. In the case of the graver crimes, only once is there given place for penitence; but these common things, which we frequently incur, always admit of penance, and without intermission they are redeemed. (On Leviticus, XIV)

The concept of "mortal sin" is at this stage still a bit lacking; certainly it included unchastity (cf. Tertullian's views on adultery), homicide and apostasy.

Origen's views on sin, penance and salvation are quite interesting. First of all, salvation is always dependent on one's will:

God the Father of all things, in order to ensure the salvation of all his creatures through the indescribable plan of his Word and wisdom, so arranged each of these, that every spirit, whether soul or rational existence, however called, should not be compelled by force, against the liberty of his own will, to any other course than to which the motives of his own mind led him. (De Princ. II)

But Origen also taught that everybody can (and possibly will) be saved, including Satan himself: from which one could derive that there are really no sins that cannot be forgiven. Obviously this view was not easy to digest (especially when seen in the context of Origen's idea of universal restoration): it just did not fit very well with the concept of the reality of sin, nor it resonated with the power structures that allowed participation to (or excommunication from) the church depending on adherence (or not) to some thought system. So Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, formerly a friend of Origen, and later one who strongly resented the fact that Origen had been ordained a presbyter away from his home church, very clearly said:

Away with Origen! What is to become of virtue, and heaven, and--clerical power, if the fear of eternal punishment is not forever kept before men's eyes as the prop of human and divine authority?

(can't find the direct reference; quoted in Hanson) This shows very well how a doctrine of (post-baptismal) sin can be instrumental to the exercise of authority. No surprise that Butterworth writes "No opinion of Origen's was more vehemently opposed than this one which gave demons and lost men a chance of restoration". Cf. Jerome:

while in word he [i.e. Origen] asserts the resurrection of the flesh, he destroys the force of this language by other assertions. As, for instance, that, after many ages and one "restitution of all things," it will be the same for Gabriel as for the devil, for Paul as for Caiaphas, for virgins as for prostitutes. (Ep. ad Pammachium et Oceanum, VII)

At any rate, it would not be fair to say that Origen discounted sin so as to consider it irrelevant. When considering the treatment to be reserved to lapsed Christians, he wrote that they could be readdmitted into the community, but at certain conditions; and the fact of having lapsed rendered them unsuitable to clerical office:

They [i.e. the Christians] admit them [i.e. the lapsed] [...] provided that they show a real conversion, though their period of probation is longer than that required of those who are joining the community for the first time. But they [i.e. the Christians] do not select those who have fallen after their conversion to Christianity for any office or administration in the Church of God, as it is called. (Contra Celsum, III.51)

Here Origen seems to reflect the common practice of the church, confirmed by Cyprian when he was dealing with the lapsed Spanish bishops (more on this later). Against this practice of readmitting lapsed Christians to the Church was Novatian. It is most interesting that, in his rejection of the lapsed, Novatian also denied validity to baptism itself. As Dionysius of Alexandria writes to Dionysius of Rome,

And besides all this he [i.e. Novatian] rejects the holy baptism, and overturns the faith and confession which precede it. (Eusebius, HE VII.8)

As a matter of fact, Novatian re-baptized all those who came over to him from the Church considering the baptism administered by others as invalid. The idea of true vs. false baptism will be later adopted by the Donatists.

And finally we turn to Cyprian, who was directly concerned with the problem of the lapsed, of re-baptism, and of post-baptismal sin, due to the persecutions started in 250 with Decius. First of all, Cyprian was certainly horrified by the mass aposthasy that took place e.g. in Carthage, and was not at all sympatethic to those who lapsed, although he himself preferred to flee away from Carthage when the persecution broke (which gained him not a lot of support from the roman clergy, who had their own bishop Fabian martyred during the same persecution); actually he wrote a self-defence to explain his behavior:

I have thought it necessary to write this letter to yon, wherein I might give an account to you of my doings, my discipline, and my diligence; for, as the Lord's commands teach, immediately the first burst of the disturbance arose, and the people with violent clamour repeatedly demanded me, I, taking into consideration not so much my own safety as the public peace of the brethren, withdrew for a while, lest, by my over-bold presence, the tumult which had begun might be still further provoked. (Ep. XIV.1)

But in general he appears to have taken a very realistic approach when dealing with the problem of the lapsed. In particular, he explains at length the decisions of the Council of Carthage (251), mentioning "wholesome moderation":

But since in them [i.e. the lapsed] there is that, which, by subsequent repentance, may be strengthened into faith; and by repentance strength is armed to virtue, which could not be armed if one should fall away through despair; if, hardly and cruelly separated from the Church, he should turn himself to Gentile ways and to worldly works, or, if rejected by the Church, he should pass over to heretics and schismatics; where, although he should afterwards be put to death on account of the name, still, being placed outside the Church, and divided from unity and from charity, he could not in his death be crowned. And therefore it was decided, dearest brother, the case of each individual having been examined into, that the receivers of certificates should in the meantime be admitted, that those who had sacrificed should be assisted at death, because there is no confession in the place of the departed, nor can any one be constrained by us to repentance, if the fruit of repentance be taken away. If the battle should come first, strengthened by us, he will be found ready armed for the battle; but if sickness should press hard upon him before the battle, he departs with the consolation of peace and communion. (Ep. LI.17)

Here again we see the strategic value of readmitting lapsed people into the Church, i.e. what I had mentioned before in the case of Callistus, but this time with the clear and explicitly stated intent of not letting lapsed fall to sects (cf. Cyprian's concern for the unity of the Church) or to gentile ways. So Cyprian does allow for repentance, and even aposthasy may be remitted, as it appears from the final part of De Lapsis:

If a man make prayer with his whole heart, if he groan with the true lamentations and tears of repentance, if be incline the Lord to pardon of his sin by righteous and continual works, he who expressed His mercy in these words may pity such men: "When you turn and lament, then shall you be saved, and shall know where you have been." [...] He can show mercy; He can turn back His judgment. He can mercifully pardon the repenting, the labouring, the beseeching sinner. He can regard as effectual whatever, in behalf of such as these, either martyrs have besought or priests have done. Or if any one move Him still more by his own atonement, if he appease His anger, if he appease the wrath of an indignant God by righteous entreaty, He gives arms again whereby the vanquished may be armed; He restores and confirms the strength whereby the refreshed faith may be invigorated. (On the lapsed, XXXVI)

But, as for Origen, readmission does not mean to Cyprian complete restoration, at least not for those who had offices in the Church. The letter of Cyprian to two Spanish churches makes the following two points very clear:

• the designation of bishops must be done in accordance with all the neighboring bishops and at the presence of the people "for whom a prelate is ordained"; these people are essential to the process, because they "know most fully the lives of each, and are thoroughly acquainted with the character of every one from his conversation." Now, this procedure was apparently not followed in the case of two lapsed bishops (Basilides of Leon and Martial of Merida), who were seeking to be restored to the bishopric office by means of an appeal to the bishop of Rome, Stephen (discarding also the fact that other bishops had replaced them already).
  
• the sin of aposthasy (of which Basilides and Martial were guilty), although it can be forgiven, prohibits anyone from entering the clergy, and this is true even for those who once were bishops:

  [it is] evident that men of that mind can neither preside over the Church of Christ, nor ought to offer sacrifices to God: especially since our colleague Cornelius, a peaceable and righteous priest, and by the favour of the Lord honoured also with martyrdom, long since decreed in conjunction with us and with all the bishops consituted throughout the whole world, that such men might indeed be admitted to do penance, but must be kept back from the doors of the clergy and the honour of the priesthood.

A key point here is the establishment of a sort of canon law, agreed by "all the bishops". What the two lapsed bishops were trying to do was to circumvent this law, appealing to another bishop (Stephen). And from the above one could also say that while the sin of aposthasy does not invalidate baptism, it does invalidate priesthood. This obviously is interesting because it shows that the idea of universal priesthood does not apply here (but certainly Cyprian was not the first on this point -- cf. for example Didache XV, 1 Clement XLIV, or Tertullian's De Baptismo XVII). The other big issue is the meaning of priesthood in the context of a theology of the sacraments, which again is in this ante-nicene period not very well defined: for example, we still don't see here traces of the idea that priesthood imprints on the soul "an indelible spiritual mark" - and that, therefore, ordination cannot be repeated nor canceled, and so, that a return to lay state is impossible (as the Council of Trent will explicitly say).

We should also not forget that in the eyes of Cyprian, of all possible sins, Basilides and Martial were guilty of the most pernicious one: schism. In his On the Unity of the Church he wrote:

And this unity we ought firmly to hold and assert, especially those of us that are bishops who preside in the Church, that we may also prove the episcopate itself to be one and undivided. Let no one deceive the brotherhood by a falsehood: let no one corrupt the truth of the faith by perfidious prevarication. The episcopate is one, each part of which is held by each one for the whole. [...]
Whoever is separated from the Church and is joined to an adulteress, is separated from the promises of the Church; nor can he who forsakes the Church of Christ attain to the rewards of Christ. He is a stranger; he is profane; he is an enemy. He can no longer have God for his Father, who has not the Church for his mother. If any one could escape who was outside the ark of Noah, then he also may escape who shall be outside of the Church. (On the Unity of the Church, V.VI)

Digression: the maxim "he can no longer have God for his Father, who has not the Church for his mother" is quoted by Calvin (who quoted also the even more famous Cyprianism extra ecclesiam nulla salus) in Institutes, 4:1.

The next point that is absolutely essential in the debate on sin is Cyprian's refusal to consider heretical baptism as valid. This does not mean that he wanted to re-baptize heretics: he is just saying that what was administered to heretics was not baptism:

When we were together in council, dearest brethren, we read your letter which you wrote to us concerning those who seem to be baptized by heretics and schismatics, (asking) whether, when the), come to the Catholic Church, which is one, they ought to be baptized. On which matter, although you yourselves hold thereupon the truth and certainty of the Catholic rule, yet since you have thought that of our mutual love we ought to be consulted, we put forward our opinion, not as a new one, but we join with you in equal agreement, in an opinion long since decreed by our predecessors, and observed by us,-judging, namely, and holding it for certain that no one can be baptized abroad outside the Church, since there is one baptism appointed in the holy Church. (Ep. LXIX.1)

For I know not by what presumption some of our colleagues are led to think that they who have been dipped by heretics ought not to be baptized when they come to us, for the reason that they say that there is one baptism which indeed is therefore one, because the Church is one, and there cannot be any baptism out of the Church. For since there cannot be two baptisms, if heretics truly baptize, they themselves have this baptism. (Ep. LXX.1)

This position will be exploited during the Donatist controversy, with the Donatists arguing that sacraments had to be considered invalid because of subjective imperfections on the part of the person administering them. This position can actually be seen as starting from what Cyprian (and Origen) had said with regard to the necessity of a bishop to be immaculate in order to remain a bishop. The clarification will come from Augustine, who will argue that, in a church made of saints and sinners, the sacraments are to be understood as efficacious ex opere operato (i.e. on account of the grace of Christ) rather than ex opere operantis (i.e. on account of personal moral qualitites). The ultimate reason for this is naturally that, in the Augustine world view, it is impossible for fallen beings to distinguish who is pure and impure, worthy and unworthy.

By way of conclusion: controversies over post-baptismal sin, almost not documented in the very early church, seem to be mostly associated to questions of  definition of authority (what is the true catholic church, what are heresies) on the one hand, and to problems of purity on the other.

But vivid doctrinal debates and the lack of a developed theology of the sacraments make it difficult to establish authority itself, as the polemics between Hippolytus and Callistus and between Cyprian and lapsed christians (and notably bishops) prove.

At the same time, the lack of a clear theology of salvation permits positions ranging from those of a Tertullian in his Montanist phase (the quest for absolute purity) to Origen's vision of universal salvation; both these positions were, for opposite reasons, not effective for the consolidation of the same Church their proponents were sincerely believing in, and were thus destined to be rejected: the former because exclusivism could not embrace the masses and ultimately failed to account for human nature; the latter because it undermined the human power structures that hold together the very same concept of orthodoxy.

In the end, a relatively moderate position like that of Cyprian (who anyway very strongly argued for doctrinal unity centered around councils, thus strengthening the position of the Church against scattered movements), later clarified by Augustine to avoid the excesses of the Donatists, prevailed, and the mechanisms to deal with post-baptismal sins had to evolve to include formalized ways toward penance and reconciliation.

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Categories: Church_History

Didache, VII:

And concerning baptism, baptize this way: Having first said all these things, baptize into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, in living water. But if you have no living water, baptize into other water; and if you cannot do so in cold water, do so in warm. But if you have neither, pour out water three times upon the head into the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit. But before the baptism let the baptizer fast, and the baptized, and whoever else can; but you shall order the baptized to fast one or two days before.

Justin, First Apology, LXI:

I will also relate the manner in which we dedicated ourselves to God when we had been made new through Christ; [...] Then they are brought by us where there is water, and are regenerated in the same manner in which we were ourselves regenerated. For, in the name of God, the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, they then receive the washing with water. For Christ also said, "Except ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. [...] And for this [rite] we have learned from the apostles this reason. Since at our birth we were born without our own knowledge or choice, by our parents coming together, and were brought up in bad habits and wicked training; in order that we may not remain the children of necessity and of ignorance, but may become the children of choice and knowledge, and may obtain in the water the remission of sins formerly committed, there is pronounced over him who chooses to be born again, and has repented of his sins, the name of God the Father and Lord of the universe; [...] And this washing is called illumination, because they who learn these things are illuminated in their understandings. And in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and in the name of the Holy Ghost, who through the prophets foretold all things about Jesus, he who is illuminated is washed.

Clinical baptism (by aspersion) was normally reserved to infirmed people, and some had doubts on its validity. But Cyprian defended it, and it is interesting to see the words he used (faith is more important than the means used to confer baptism, consistently with what the Didache had taught already):

In the sacrament of salvation the contagion of sins is not in such wise washed away, as the filth of the skin and of the body is washed away in the carnal and ordinary washing, as that there should be need of saltpetre and other appliances also, and a bath and a basin wherewith this vile body must be washed and purified. Otherwise is the breast of the believer washed; otherwise is the mind of man purified by the merit of faith. [...] The sprinkling also of water prevails equally with the washing of salvation; and that when this is done in the Church, where the faith both of receiver and giver is sound, all things hold and may be consummated and perfected by the majesty of the Lord and by the truth of faith. (Epistle LXXV)

Novatian, presbyter, had been baptized on a sickbed by aspersion. This is important because at the time of Novatian this was apparently not perceived as a big problem; but later (Council of Neo-Caesarea, after 314) we find a statement like this:

Whosoever has received clinical baptism cannot be promoted to the priesthood, because his [profession of] faith was not from free choice, but from necessity (lit: fear of death), unless he, excel afterwards in zeal and faith, or there is a deficiency of [able] men.

These words are interesting in the discussion about infant baptism.

For what regards the distinction between baptism by immersion and baptism by sprinkling or pouring, cf. Aquinas, III, Q66, A7, "Utrum immersio in aqua sit de necessitate baptismi": at Aquinas' time it seems that baptism by immersion was the most practiced type; but this "non est de necessitate baptismi", although he seems to recommend baptism "per modum aspersionis vel per modum effusionis praecipue propter necessitatem". Very realistic examples for when this type of baptism can be used are: "magna multitudo baptizandorum, propter paucitatem aquae, propter debilitatem ministri qui non potest sustentare baptizandum (!), propter debilitatem baptizandi cui posset imminere periculum mortis ex immersione."

The reason given by Aquinas to explain that immersion is not necessary resembles Cyprian's, i.e. the washing signifies the inward washing away of sins; and, more specifically, water is essential to the sacrament (cf. also Ambrose on this point), while the mode of washing is accidental (this is also the reason why Aquinas says that trine immersion is not essential, see III, Q66, A8). Aquinas reminds of Cyprian also when he explains that "principalis pars corporis, preacipue quantum ad exteriora mebra, est caput, in quo vigent omnes sensus et interiores et exteriores", and hence the head is the part that should be washed when immersion is not possible: "ideo [...] oportet caput perfundere, in quo manifestatur principium animalis vitae" (A7, ad 3). Cf. Cyprian, who says that the "mind of man is purified".

Tertullian mentions sponsors in the baptismal rite, specifically pointing to infant baptism, which he apparently opposed (although it is interesting to read that the main reason he is opposing it seems to be to "protect" the sponsores):

[...] cunctatio baptismi utilior est, praecipue tamen circa parvulos: quid enim necesse, si non tam necesse est, sponsores etiam periculo ingeri, qui et ipsi per mortalitatem destituere promissiones suas possunt et proventu malae indolis falli? (De Baptismo, XVIII)

Origen, on the other hand, assumes without problems that infant baptism is current practice:

Infants are baptized for the remission of sins. What sins? Whenever have they sinned? In fact, of course, never. And yet: 'No one is free from defilement.' (Job 14:4) But defilement is only put away by the mystery of baptism. That is the reason why infants too are baptized. (Homily on Luke, XIV)

Hippolytus too refers to infant baptism in his Apostolic Tradition:

When they come to the water, the water shall be pure and flowing, that is, the water of a spring or a flowing body of water. Then they shall take off all their clothes. The children shall be baptized first. All of the children who can answer for themselves, let them answer. If there are any children who cannot answer for themselves, let their parents answer for them, or someone else from their family. After this, the men will be baptized. Finally, the women, after they have unbound their hair, and removed their jewelry. No one shall take any foreign object with themselves down into the water. (Ap. Trad. XXI)

For what regards the NT and infant baptism, nowhere it is mandated, but nowhere it is prohibited, either; and there are episodes where entire households were baptized (therefore most likely including infants, e.g. 1 Cor 1:16, Acts 16:15); also, Paul in Col. 2:11-12 makes a parallel between the spiritual practice of baptism and the jewish circumcision, to signify that baptism marks one's belonging to Christ:

In him you were also circumcised, in the putting off of the sinful nature, not with a circumcision done by the hands of men but with the circumcision done by Christ, having been buried with him in baptism and raised with him through your faith in the power of God, who raised him from the dead.

This is reaffirmed by Justin in his Dialog with Trypho the Jew:

[...] that very baptism which he announced is alone able to purify those who have repented. [...] For what is the use of that baptism which cleanses the flesh and body alone? Baptize the soul from wrath and from covetousness, from envy, and from hatred; and, lo! the body is pure. For this is the symbolic significance of unleavened bread, that you do not commit the old deeds of wicked leaven. But you have understood all things in a carnal sense, and you suppose it to be piety if you do such things, while your souls are filled with deceit, and, in short, with every wickedness. (Dialogue with Trypho, XIV)

And Cyprian says:

But in respect of the case of the infants, which you say ought not to be baptized within the second or third day after their birth, and that the law of ancient circumcision should be regarded, so that you think that one who is just born should not be baptized and sanctified within the eighth day, we all thought very differently in our council. For in this course which you thought was to be taken, no one agreed; but we all rather judge that the mercy and grace of God is not to be refused to any one born of man.
[...]
For which reason we think that no one is to be hindered from obtaining grace by that law which was already ordained, and that spiritual circumcision ought not to be hindered by carnal circumcision, but that absolutely every man is to be admitted to the grace of Christ, since Peter also in the Acts of the Apostles speaks, and says, "The Lord hath said to me that I should call no man common or unclean." But if anything could hinder men from obtaining grace, their more heinous sins might rather hinder those who are mature and grown up and older. But again, if even to the greatest sinners, and to those who had sinned much against God, when they subsequently believed, remission of sins is granted-and nobody is hindered from baptism and from grace-how much rather ought we to shrink from hindering an infant, who, being lately born, has not sinned, except in that, being born after the flesh according to Adam, he has contracted the contagion of the ancient death at its earliest birth, who approaches the more easily on this very account to the reception of the forgiveness of sins-that to him are remitted, not his own sins, but the sins of another. (Epistle LVIII, 2;5)

In general, it seems that the meaning/function of baptism in the early Church was of obtaining grace and purification from sins. For a first example, cf. Tertullian:

"De Sacramento aquae nostrae qua ablutis delictis pristinae caecitatis in vitam aeternam liberamur" or, according to the Editio Martini Mesnartii, "Felix sacramentum aquae nostrae quia ablutis delictis pristinae caecitatis in vitam aeternam liberamur". (De Baptismo, I)

This obviously immediately brings about the problem of how it is possible that people who have been baptized/purified still keep on sinning. A definitive clarification on this issue will have to wait for Augustine, with his theory of original sin (which in fact seems to have at least some similarity to what Origen says in his Homily on Luke about infant baptism, and in Cyprian, Epistle LVIII, see above) and specifically in the distinction he made between guilt and disease: the guilt of the original sin is cancelled by baptism, while the effects (the "disease") are not. See the article Babies, Baptism, and Original Sin for an account of Augustine's view in particular with regard to infant baptism. This theory of the original guilt that is canceled by baptism has clearly the consequence of asking for the necessity of baptism for salvation (the scriptural reference usually quoted here is John 3:5, "I tell you the truth, no one can enter the kingdom of God unless he is born of water and the Spirit").

This concept will then lead to the idea of limbo as the place in afterlife for those who died unbaptized and without having committed mortal sins. Cf. Dante, Inferno, Canto IV, 25-42:

Quivi, secondo che per ascoltare,
non avea pianto mai che di sospiri

che l’aura etterna facevan tremare;
ciò avvenia di duol sanza martìri,
ch’avean le turbe, ch’eran molte e grandi,

d’infanti e di femmine e di viri.
Lo buon maestro a me: "Tu non dimandi
che spiriti son questi che tu vedi?

Or vo’ che sappi, innanzi che più andi,
ch’ei non peccaro; e s’elli hanno mercedi,
non basta, perché non ebber battesmo,

ch’è porta de la fede che tu credi;
e s’e’ furon dinanzi al cristianesmo,
non adorar debitamente a Dio:

e di questi cotai son io medesmo.
Per tai difetti, non per altro rio,
semo perduti, e sol di tanto offesi

che sanza speme vivemo in disio".

But I digress. Back to the meaning of baptism, what is clear is that at this stage it is still too early to talk about a theology distinguishing between causative vs. declarative functions of the sacraments. Indeed, it seems that the consensus was of seeing sacraments as really efficient bestowals of grace. The examples for what regards baptism are not hard to find (beyond Tertullian's quote above and Justin's statement that "[we] may obtain in the water the remission of sins formerly committed", also above):

But let us enquire whether the Lord took care to signify before hand concerning the water and the cross. Now concerning the water it is written in reference to Israel, how that they would not receive the baptism which bringeth remission of sins, but would build for themselves. (Barnabas 11:1)

"I have heard, Sir," say I, "from certain teachers, that there is no other repentance, save that which took place when we went down into the water and obtained remission of our former sins."
He saith to me; "Thou hast well heard; for so it is. For he that hath received remission of sins ought no longer to sin, but to dwell in purity. (Hermas, Mandate 4, 3[31]:1-2)

Ambrose wrote profusely on baptism and the Holy Spirit supporting the idea of efficient grace in baptism; McGrath says that Ambrose argued that in baptism, the Holy Spirit "coming upon the font or upon those who are to be baptized, effects the reality of regeneration" - this is a very clear statement, but I was not able to find the direct reference to this quote in Ambrose's writings.

As a further digression, see what Zwingli has to say with regard to this interpretation of the function of sacraments in Zwingli on Baptism and in the short Summary of Zwingli on Baptism; notable is the idea that baptism is a sign of belonging to a covenant community, analogous to circumcision (i.e. a "birth into a believing community"), and the hint that "If we deny that children should be baptized [because of lack of scriptural evidence], then we must deny that women should come to the table, because there is no positive evidence that they were communicated in NT".

Cf. the importance of the subjective element in the baptismal salvific process in Mark 16:16: "Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned.", which somewhat echoes Zwingli's position that "In this matter of baptism — if I may be pardoned for saying it — I can only conclude that all the doctors have been in error from the time of the apostles. . . . All the doctors have ascribed to the water a power which it does not have and the holy apostles did not teach." (Zwingli, On Baptism)

Hopefully, I'll have time to study this and other positions (e.g. B.H. Carroll's) more in depth later.

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Categories: Church_History

Modern definitions:

• Economic trinitarianism: God is three in his works, but one in his being.
• Immanent or essential trinitarianism: the being of God in himself has a threefold quality.
  

Ebionism	According to Eusebius (HE, III.27), some of the Ebionites considered Christ a plain and common man, who was justified only because of his superior virtue, and who was the fruit of the intercourse of a man with Mary. Others (ibid.) did accept that Christ was born of a virgin and of the Holy Spirit, but refused to acknowledge that he pre-existed, being God, Word, and Wisdom. and so were not considered essentially different from the first group.
Gnosticism	As noted already, it is difficult to confine gnosticism within fixed categories. For what regards Christology, one could perhaps summarize that Christ was often seen on a level with other aeons, (inferior) emanations of the supreme God (Christ being one of the highest aeons); that there are multiple sons of God; and that the dualism typical of gnosticism makes it natural to derive that the true nature of Christ was spiritual (docetism). According to Irenaeus (AH I.XXVI), Cerinthus thought that Christ descended upon the man Jesus (born of Joseph and Mary) in the form of a dove from the Supreme Ruler, and that then he proclaimed the unknown Father, and performed miracles. But at last Christ departed from Jesus, and that then Jesus suffered and rose again, while Christ remained impassible, inasmuch as he was a spiritual being. Cf. docetist interpretations of Mark 1:10 (the divine entering into Jesus, καταβαινον εις αυτον) and of Mark 15:34 ("God, why have you left me behind?", εγκατελιπες με)
Ignatius	For Ignatius, Christ is certainly divine: There is one only physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true Life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord. (Rom. 7:2) And, at the same time, Christ is certainly man, and his humanity is actually the reason why Ignatius' own suffering is meaningful to him. So, against the docetists, he says But if it were as certain persons who are godless, that is unbelievers, say, that He suffered only in semblance, being themselves mere semblance, why am I in bonds? And why also do I desire to fight with wild beasts? So I die in vain. (Trall. 10:1) and Jesus was truly nailed up in the flesh for our sakes [...] and He suffered truly, as also He raised Himself truly [... and] He was in the flesh even after the resurrection. (cf. Smyrn. 1-3)
Justin Martyr	From the double meaning of Logos (reason and word, cf. Philo), Justin distinguishes two elements in Christ's divinity: the immanent: revelation of God to himself within himself the expressed: God reveals himself outwardly Procession of the Logos from God is via generation, without division of diminution of the divine substance. This generation took place before the creation of the world (it is not necessarily eternal, as in Athanasius' metaphysical necessity), and derives from the free will of God. Justin is thus probably an economic trinitarian. The Logos is a person numerically distinct from the Father (hypostatical being) - numerically, but not conceptually. The Logos (before its incarnation) is responsible for the teophanies of the OT. The Logos/Christ is the Reason of reasons and is object of worship. Being Reason of reasons, in every rational soul there is something Christian: the doctrine of the Logos spermatikos. Justin suggests: moral unity of Father and Son; and, at the same time, the Son is subordinate to the Father hence, a combination of hypostasianism and subordinationism.
Clement of Alexandria	The Logos is the ultimate principle of all existence, without beginning, timeless; the revealer of the Father, the sum of all intelligence and wisdom, the personal truth, the speaking as well as the spoken word of creative power, the proper author of the world, the source of light and life, the great educator of the human race, at last becoming man, to draw us into fellowship with him and make us partakers of his divine nature.
Origen	Eternal generation of the Son; but this is in close connection with eternal creation: so the generation is not an instantaneous act, but, like creation, always going on. So the Father cannot be without the Son. But at the same time the Son exhibits a difference in substance, and the Son is inferior to the Father (Deus de Deo). The key points are that: God created all things; all really means all, so God created Christ as well, at some time in eternity past; Christ is equal to God, but by the transference of God's being. Hence, he is subordinate to God. Therefore the Son should not be directly addressed in prayer (in the sense of absolute worship). This position will be exploited in Arianism (cf. also Dionysius of Alexandria). Thus Origen is a proponent of essential trinitarianism: God, his Son and his Spirit are co-eternal and eternally distinct.
Irenaeus	The Creator is the one and only God, maker of heaven and earth. Logos and "Son of God" are used interchangeably. God is above all antitheses, absolutely simple and unchangeable: in him before and after, thinking and speaking, coincide. Therefore, he repudiates the distinction of an immanent vs. expressed God (of Justin and of the Valentinians). The derivation of the Son from the Father is an incomprehensible mistery and cannot be explained. The Father is God revealing himself, the Son is God revealed (the appearing revelation). There is a clear distinction between generation and creation: the world is created, but the Son is begotten of the Father and still like him, increate, without beginning, eternal (as in the Nicene creed: genitum, non factum). But in several passages he subordinates the Son to the Father. This is probably meant to distinguish the eternal Logos from the actual Christ (the "Christ of history"), so he would not be a subordinationist. Still, he rejects the idea of the Word as one light kindled from the other (AH 2.17.4), i.e. the Nicene light from light. At the other extreme, he has been charged of sabellianism, but he asserts alike the essential unity and the eternal personal distinction of the Father and the Son. He is then not an essential trinitarian (unexplained derivation of the Son from the Father) and, at the same time, Hall says he is not an economic trinitarian either (actually to me it looks more like he could be, with his insistence on the the one and only God, against Marcion and the Gnostics).
Tertullian	On the one hand he could be labeled a subordinationist: the Father is the whole divine substance, and the Son a part of it. Not two suns, but the sun and the beam, two distinct species in one essentia. The sunbeam can be called sun, but not vice versa. (remember that he was interested in opposing the Patripassian Praxeas.) But at the same time he proposes this threefold hypostatical existence of the Son: pre-existent, eternal immanence of the Son in the Father (even before creation); coming forth of the Son with the Father for the purpose of creation; manifestation of the Son in the world by the incarnation. The technical terms he uses for the Trinity were to become the customary ones in Latin theology: tres personae, una substantia (where substantia in Tertullian means "a being", to reinforce the unity of God). Note that he explicitly says (against patripassianism) that, in the passion of Christ, the divine suffers only in the Son. Hall suggests (and rightly so, it seems to me) that Tertullian is an economic trinitarian (because of the insistence on the Father as the whole divine substance and of his concept of substantia) trying to be an essentialist (because of the eternal immanence of the Son in the Father). For what regards the person of Christ, Tertullian says there are two substances in him, Word and flesh, and they are combined, not fused: so that Christ is true God and true man.
Monarchianism	God is single, so Father, Son and Sprit are one and the same; Jesus Christ is God, without personal distinction from the Father. Since Father, Son and Spirit are seen as different modes of operation of one person (God), monarchianism is also called modalism. And since it teaches that the Father suffers with the Son, it is also called patripassianism. Cf. Tertullian's Against Praxeas and Hippolytus' Against Noetus. Note the following sequence: Victor, bishop of Rome (the one of the quartodeciman quarrel). Allegedly fought against the monarchianism of Theodotus the Cobbler ("the leader and father of this God-denying apostasy, and the first to declare that Christ is mere man", according to Eusebius, HE 5.28.6). To him succeeds Zephyrinus. This seems to be the bishop of Rome mentioned by Tertullian in Against Praxeas I (Tertullian says that this bishop followed Praxeas, and that because of this "Duo negotia diaboli Praxeas Romae procuravit, prophetiam expulit et haeresim intulit, paracletum fugavit et patrem crucifixit.") Said by Hippolytus (in Refutation of All Heresies, IX-II.VI) to be an "ignorant and illiterate individual" who had been bribed by Cleomenes to tolerate monarchianism; Cleomenes was the successor of Epigonus, who was the successor of Noetus (Hippolytus' Noetus, "a native of Smyrna, [...] who introduced a heresy from the tenets of Heraclitus", ibid.). Zephyrinus, at least again according to Hippolytus, was controlled by Callistus, Zephyrinus' self-proclaimed successor; Callistus condemned Hippolytus as a ditheist (see below what Hippolytus himself has to say about this allegation). Conversely, Hippolytus says that Callistus acknowledges that there is one Father and God, viz., the Creator of the universe, and that this (God) is spoken of, and called by the name of Son, yet that in substance He is one Spirit. For Spirit, as the Deity, is, he says, not any being different from the Logos, or the Logos from the Deity; therefore this one person, (according to Callistus,) is divided nominally, but substantially not so. (Ref. X.XXIII) So, to Callistus, the Spirit incarnate in Jesus was the Father, and the Father co-suffers with the Son (cf. instead again Tertullian). In this sense, Callistus reminds of Irenaeus and seems to propose a theology that fits between Hippolytus and Sabellius (Callistus excommunicated Sabellius, by the way). There will be more to say about Callistus when dealing with the disputes about baptism and sins. For what regards Sabellius, we have little factual evidence. It is said that Sabellius was the main representative of modalist monarchianism (against adoptionist monarchianism, where the Logos, or the Spirit, became Christ). Anyway, Sabellianism came to be understood as the counter-force to Logos Christology, stressing the fact that the essence is the same in Father, Son, and Spirit: the differences between the three are just of appearance. Paul Tillich suggests that this points to the struggle between Triniarian (eastern) vs. Christological (western) thought, or between a hierarchical theology (east) and one looking more at divine monarchy and at the humanity of Jesus (west).
Hippolytus	The Logos became man in Christ; this Logos differs from God, and is the mediator between God and creatures. Hippolytus (read Lightfoot), presbyter and probably bishop (hence "antibishop", against bishop Callistus) in Rome, seems to bring to the west concepts typical of the east. There is one God, the knowledge of whom we gain from the Holy Scriptures [which Scriptures?, one could obviously ask] [...] God, subsisting alone, and having nothing contemporaneous with Himself, determined to create the world. And conceiving the world in mind, and willing and uttering the word, He made it. [...] And thus there appeared another beside Himself. But when I say another, I do not mean that there are two Gods, but that it is only as light of light, or as water from a fountain, or as a ray from the sun. [...] These things then, brethren, are declared by the Scriptures. And the blessed John, in the testimony of his Gospel, gives us an account of this economy (disposition) and acknowledges this Word as God, when he says, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." If, then, the Word was with God, and was also God, what follows? Would one say that he speaks of two Gods? I shall not indeed speak of two Gods, but of one; of two Persons however, and of a third economy (disposition), viz., the grace of the Holy Ghost. For the Father indeed is One, but there are two Persons, because there is also the Son; and then there is the third, the Holy Spirit.  (Cf. Against Noetus, 9-14) Here the key intuition was to remove the problem of ditheism introducing the clarification that equality between Father and Son (and Spirit, although, as seen above, considerations on the third person flow less smoothly) does not mean identification.
Novatian	The severe Novatian seems to develop a theology that mediates between Hippolytus and Callistus. The Son existed in substantia (as an individual being) before time: "he was in the Father before he was with the Father", and in this he actually resembles Origen's eternal generation of the Son. But even if the Son is distinct from the Father, this does not imply a doctrine of two gods.

Excursus 1: speaking of Callistus, and thinking of the concept of bodily resurrection, remember the inscription of the deacon Severus found in the catacombs of St. Callistus (the catacombs, on the Appian Way, are at the site of the cemetery that Callistus administered, having been appointed there by Zephyrinus):

Molto importante anche il riferimento alla resurrezione della carne: Severo dice che "il cubicolo accoglie il corpo della bambina Severa (morta all'età di 9 anni e 11 mesi) che resterà in questo luogo fino a quando sarà fatto risorgere da Colui (cioè dal Signore) il quale ne rapì l'anima casta, pudica e inviolabile per l'eternità: anima che sarà restituita al corpo adorna di gioia spirituale."  (From romasegreta.it)

The inscription is dated between 296 and 304 and is important also because it is the first document where the Bishop of Rome (Marcellinus, in this case) is called "pope" (in the inscription: "PP").

Excursus 2: speaking of Sabellius, he is mentioned in Dante's Paradiso, Canto XIII. This is where Aquinas explains to Dante in which sense Solomon is to be considered "the wisest man". Here is an excerpt of this beautiful and complex canto (with some javascript-based references to the Nicene creed, the foundation of the entire speech of Aquinas), including the stanza where Sabellius appears:

Ciò che non more e ciò che può morire
non è se non splendor di quella idea

che partorisce, amando, il nostro Sire;
ché quella viva luce che sì mea
dal suo lucente, che non si disuna

da lui né da l’amor ch’a lor s’intrea,
per sua bontate il suo raggiare aduna,
quasi specchiato, in nove sussistenze,

etternalmente rimanendosi una.
Quindi discende a l’ultime potenze
giù d’atto in atto, tanto divenendo,

che più non fa che brevi contingenze;
e queste contingenze essere intendo
le cose generate, che produce

con seme e sanza seme il ciel movendo.
La cera di costoro e chi la duce
non sta d’un modo; e però sotto ’l segno

idëale poi più e men traluce.
Ond’elli avvien ch’un medesimo legno,
secondo specie, meglio e peggio frutta;

e voi nascete con diverso ingegno.
Se fosse a punto la cera dedutta
e fosse il cielo in sua virtù supprema,

la luce del suggel parrebbe tutta;
ma la natura la dà sempre scema,
similemente operando a l’artista

ch’a l’abito de l’arte ha man che trema.
Però se ’l caldo amor la chiara vista
de la prima virtù dispone e segna,

tutta la perfezion quivi s’acquista.
Così fu fatta già la terra degna
di tutta l’animal perfezïone;

così fu fatta la Vergine pregna;
sì ch’io commendo tua oppinïone,
che l’umana natura mai non fue

né fia qual fu in quelle due persone.
Or s’i’ non procedesse avanti piùe,
"Dunque, come costui fu sanza pare?"

comincerebber le parole tue.
Ma perché paia ben ciò che non pare,
pensa chi era, e la cagion che ’l mosse,

quando fu detto "Chiedi", a dimandare.
Non ho parlato sì, che tu non posse
ben veder ch’el fu re, che chiese senno

acciò che re sufficïente fosse;
non per sapere il numero in che enno
li motor di qua sù, o se necesse

con contingente mai necesse fenno;
non si est dare primum motum esse,
o se del mezzo cerchio far si puote

trïangol sì ch’un retto non avesse.
Onde, se ciò ch’io dissi e questo note,
regal prudenza è quel vedere impari

in che lo stral di mia intenzion percuote;
e se al "surse" drizzi li occhi chiari,
vedrai aver solamente respetto

ai regi, che son molti, e ’ buon son rari.
Con questa distinzion prendi ’l mio detto;
e così puote star con quel che credi

del primo padre e del nostro Diletto.
E questo ti sia sempre piombo a’ piedi,
per farti mover lento com’uom lasso

e al sì e al no che tu non vedi:
ché quelli è tra li stolti bene a basso,
che sanza distinzione afferma e nega

ne l’un così come ne l’altro passo;
perch’elli ’ncontra che più volte piega
l’oppinïon corrente in falsa parte,

e poi l’affetto l’intelletto lega.
Vie più che ’ndarno da riva si parte,
perché non torna tal qual e’ si move,

chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l’arte.
E di ciò sono al mondo aperte prove
Parmenide, Melisso e Brisso e molti,

li quali andaro e non sapëan dove;
sì fé Sabellio e Arrio e quelli stolti
che furon come spade a le Scritture

in render torti li diritti volti.
Non sien le genti, ancor, troppo sicure
a giudicar, sì come quei che stima

le biade in campo pria che sien mature;
ch’i’ ho veduto tutto ’l verno prima
lo prun mostrarsi rigido e feroce,

poscia portar la rosa in su la cima;
e legno vidi già dritto e veloce
correr lo mar per tutto suo cammino,

perire al fine a l’intrar de la foce.
Non creda donna Berta e ser Martino,
per vedere un furare, altro offerere,

vederli dentro al consiglio divino;
ché quel può surgere, e quel può cadere".

(Paradiso, Canto XIII, 52-142)

So, here Sabellius (and Arius) are accused of a most fundamental error (especially in a thomistic perspective!): of not having been able to properly apply the distinctions that make the difference between "donna Berta e ser Martino" (the English "John Doe", one could say) and the wise man; they failed because they came to conclusions too hastily, stubbornly refusing to admit their error (possibly because of pride: "l'affetto l'intelletto lega".) Too sure of their quick conclusions, off they went, and without knowing where they were actually going, "andaro e non sapëan dove", distorting the truth revelead in the Scriptures (divine revelation being the only sure guide to knowledge here.) In the end, the judgement is that they worked on a task for which they were not fit ("chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l'arte.") Certainly, as Virgil says in Purgatorio, III.34-36, "Matto è chi spera che nostra ragione / possa trascorrer la infinita via / che tiene una sustanza in tre persone.", so admittedly it was not (nor it is) an easy task.

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Categories: Church_History